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1.  lntroduct I  on 
In  Its  White  Paper  on  completing  the  Internal  market  by  1992  the 
Commission  declared  Itself  In  favour  of  harmonization  of  the  laws  of  the 
Member  States  on  takeover  and  other  general  .bids  (In  this  paper,  for 
simp! lclty,  cal led  "takeover  bids").  For  this  purpose  It  sent  the 
Councl I  a  proposal  for  a  Thirteenth Dlrectlvo1  which  Is  currently  being 
amended  In  response  to  the  opinions  of .Pari lament  and  the  Economic  and 
Social  Committee. 
·~  "' 
When  It  adopted  the  proposa I  the  Comm Iss !on  was  aware  that  there  were 
obstacles  In  the  way  of  takeovers  wh'ich  might  mean  that  the  Directive 
would  not  apply  uniformly  throughout  the  Community.  The  Commission 
therefore  requested  an  external  cons~ltant  to  undertake  a  study 
identifying  these  barriers  and  making  recommendations  for  their  removal. 
The  results of  that  study  were  out! lned.to  the  Council  at  Its meet In~ on 
23  November  1989. 
The  purpose  of  this  communication  Is  to  outline  the  proposals  which  the 
Commission  Intends  to  submit  to  the  Council  In  order  to  remove  these 
obstacles. 
It  Is  desirable  from  the  standpoint  of  a  level  playing  field  In  a  Single 
Market  that  the  opennessof  companies  In  different  Member  States  to 
takeovers  should  be  broadly  similar.  This  Is  very  difficult.  to achieve  In 
view  of  the  different  levels  of  capitalization  of  different  national 
markets  within  the  Community  and  other  structural  differences.  The 
Commission  Is  conscious,  In  bringing  forward  the  regulatory  proposals 
which  follow,  that  they  do  not  themselves  overcome  this  underlying 
problem.  ,. 
It  should  be  stressed  that  the  Commission  does  not  wish  to  encourage 
takeover  bids  as  ends  In  themselves.  Its  standpo.lnt  Is  rather  that,  In 
general,  takeover  bids  may  be  viewed  In  a  posit lve  light  In  so  far  as 
they  encourage  the  selection  by  market  forces  of  the  most  competitive 
companies  and  the  restructuring  of  European  companies  which  Is 
Indispensable  to  meet  International  competition.  It  Is  Important  here  to 
ensure  that  the  fate  of  the  target  company  be  decided  by  all  of  Its 
shareholders. 
2.  Obstacles  ldentlfiQQ 
The  obstacles  may  be  divided  Into  two  categories.  The  first  concerns 
maintenance  of  the  company  capital,  and  the  second  concerns  the  voting 
rights of  the  shareholders. 
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The  first  category consists more  specifically of  the  following: 
the  power  of  the  directors to acquire  the  company's  own  shares;  and 
the  right  of  a  subsidiary  to  acquire  shares  In  a  holding  company  and 
to exercise  the  voting  rights carried by  these shares. 
The  obstacles  In  the  second  category  are  as  follows: 
disproportion  between  a  shareholders'  holding  In  the  company  capital 
and  his  voting  rights; 
difficulties with  proxy  voting; 
difficulties  In  bringing  about  changes  In  the  management  of  the 
company. 
3.  Measures  prooosed 
In  order  to  remove  the  obstacles  to  takeover  bids  described  above,  the 
Commission  wl  I I  be  proposing  the  following  to  the Council. 
(a)  It  needs  , to  be  made  clear  that  the  proposal  for  a 
Thirteenth Directive  restricts  the  power  of  the  board  of  the  target 
company  to acquire  the  company's  own  shares while  the  takeover  bid  Is 
open.  By  way  of  exception  from  other  provisions  of  Community  law 
allowing  the  board  of  a  company  to  decide  that  the  company  should 
acquire  Its own  shares,  the  board  should  require  the  authorization of 
the  general  meeting  of  shareholders  In  order  to  do  so  whl  le  a 
takeover  bid  Is open,  and  this authorization should  be obtained after 
the  takeover  bid  Is  launched.  A  clause  to  this  effect  wl  I I  be 
Inserted  In  the  amended  version  of  the  proposal  for  a 
Thirteenth Directive Which  will  be  forwarded  to  the Councl I  afte~  the 
Commission  adopts  lt. 
(b)  The  Second  Company  Law  Directive  will  have  to  be  amended  to  extend 
the  rules  on  the  acquisition  of  the  company's  own  shares  to  cover 
acquisition  by  subsidiaries.  A subsidiary  could  then  acquire  shares 
In  Its parent  only on  the  conditions  laid  down  for  the  acquisition of 
Its  own  shares  by  ~he parent  Itself.  This  would  mean  In  particular 
that: 
1.  In  calculating  the  maximum  number  of  Its  own  shares  which  a  company 
may  hold  (10%),  alI  shares  held  by  Its subsidiaries  would  have  to  be 
added  to  those  held  by  ·the  parent  company; 
2.  the  voting  rights attaching  to shares  held  by  the subsidiaries  In  the 
parent  comparw  wou 1  d  be  suspended. 
(c)  To  amend  the  proposal  for  a  Fifth  Company  Law  Directive  <Jiong  the 
I lnes set out  below  ensuring  the  coherence with  the Statute of  the 
European  Company. 
1.  Non-voting  preference shares could  not  be  Issued  to a  value exceeding 
50%  of  the  tot  a I  share  capIta I .  If  the  company  d 1  d  not  actua 1 1  y 
grant  the  special  advantages  carried  by  such  shares  within  a  stated 
time  the  shares would  automatlcal ly  become  voting shares. ' 
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2.  The  posslbl I lty  of  restricting  the  voting  rights  which  may  be 
exercised  by  any  one  shareholder  would  be  abolIshed. 
3.  Neither  the  law  nor  the  memorandum  and  articles of  association  could 
require  a  majority  greater  than  the  absolute  majority  for  a  decision 
to make  changes  In  the  board  of  a  company. 
4.  Provisions  In  the  memorandum  or  articles  of  association  giving 
certain  shareholders  the  exclusive  right  to  propose  the  appointment 
of  alI  directors  wl  I I  be  forbidden. 